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Abstract—Most applications of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) rely on data about the positions of sensor nodes, which are not
necessarily known beforehand. Several localization approaches have been proposed but most of them omit to consider that WSNs
could be deployed in adversarial settings, where hostile nodes under the control of an attacker coexist with faithful ones. Verifiable
Multilateration (VM) was proposed to cope with this problem by leveraging on a set of trusted landmark nodes that act as verifiers.
Although VM is able to recognize reliable localization measures, it allows for regions of undecided positions that can amount to the
40% of the monitored area. We studied the properties of VM as a non-cooperative two-player game where the first player employs a
number of verifiers to do VM computations and the second player controls a malicious node. The verifiers aim at securely localizing
malicious nodes, while malicious nodes strive to masquerade as unknown and to pretend false positions. Thanks to game theory, the
potentialities of VM are analyzed with the aim of improving the defender’s strategy. We found that the best placement for verifiers is an
equilateral triangle with edge equal to the power range R, and maximum deception in the undecided region is approximately 0.27R.
Moreover, we characterized—in terms of the probability of choosing an unknown node to examine further—the strategies of the players.
Index Terms—Game theory, localization games, security, wireless sensor networks
F
1 INTRODUCTION
NODE localization plays a crucial role in most wire-less sensor network (WSN) applications [1], [2]
such as environment monitoring and vehicle tracking.
Location can also be used to improve routing and sav-
ing power and to develop applications where services
are location dependent. However, the installation of
GPS receivers is often unfeasible for its costs, while
the positions of sensor nodes is not necessarily known
beforehand. In fact, nodes are often deployed randomly
or they even move, and one of the challenges is com-
puting localization at time of operations. Thus, several
localization schemes have been proposed (e.g., [3], [4],
[5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11]), but most of the current ap-
proaches omit to consider that WSNs could be deployed
in adversarial settings, where hostile nodes under the
control of an attacker coexist with faithful ones. Wireless
communications are easy to tamper and nodes are prone
to physical attacks and cloning: thus classical solutions,
based on access control and strong authentication, are
difficult to deploy due to limited power resources of
nodes.
A method, which allows to evaluate node reputation
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and the related accuracy of the monitored data, is re-
quired. In this direction, a well defined approach to
localize nodes even when some of them are compro-
mised was proposed in [12] and it is known as Verifiable
Multilateration (VM). VM computes an unknown position
by leveraging on a set of trusted landmark nodes that
act as verifiers. Although VM is able to recognize reliable
localization measures (known as robust computations)
and sure malicious behaviors, it allows for undecided
positions (unknown nodes), i.e., cases in which localization
data are not enough to mark a node as robust or malicious.
In the undecided region, a malicious node can pretend to
be in a position that is different from its true one but still
compatible with all verifiers’ information. In many cases,
a large portion of the monitored field is in the undecided
region (even more than 40%, as we show in Section 3)
and therefore, if this region is not considered, a large
area is wasted. Trivially the number of deployed verifiers
can be incremented, but this requires higher costs. In
this paper, we resort to non-cooperative game theory [13]
to deal with the problem of secure localization where a
set of verifiers and a number of independent malicious
nodes are present. The assumption of independence
between malicious nodes will allow us to adopt a two-
player game, where the first player (defender) employs
a number of verifiers to do VM computations and the
second player (attacker) controls a single malicious node.
The defender acts to securely localize the malicious node,
while the attacker tries to masquerade it as unknown
since, when recognized as malicious, its influence would
be ruled out by VM. Scenarios where attackers can form
coalitions and collude are not considered here, the reason
being the unsuitability of VM for such cases, as we will
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discuss more in detail later.
This paper provides two main original contributions.
First, we study how the verifiers should be placed in
order to minimize the maximum error the attacker might
induce if the defender accepted also unknown positions
and which is the best pair of positions (where actual and
fake positions differ the most) for the malicious node.
We accomplish such a task by modeling the situation
as an extensive-form game between the verifier player
and the malicious node player. Furthermore, we find
the minimum number of verifiers needed for assuring
a given upper bound over the error the attacker might
induce.1
Second, we introduce a probabilistic approach accord-
ing which each node is associated with a probability
to be malicious. This can be useful to determine the
reputation of the nodes. In many situations, such as
when the non-malicious nodes are distributed uniformly
over the monitored area, the probability that a non-
malicious node appears in the best position a mali-
cious node can pretend to is zero, and therefore the
verifiers, once observed the positions of all the nodes,
can recognize the malicious node with a probability of
one. As a result, the malicious node could be interested
in varying its positioning strategy in the attempt to
masquerade itself as a non-malicious one, reducing thus
the maximum induced error. We model this situation
as an extensive-form game with uncertainty and we
provide an algorithm to find the best strategies of the
two players.
The paper is organized as follow. Section 2 shortly
describes VM. Section 3 introduces the secure local-
ization games. Section 4 faces the problem of optimal
verifiers placement. Section 5 studies the distribution of
the malicious node. Section 6 provides an overview of
the related works and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 VERIFIABLE MULTILATERATION
Multilateration is the main technique used in WSNs to
estimate the coordinates of unknown nodes given the
positions of some given landmark nodes—known as an-
chor nodes—whose positions are known. The position of
an unknown node U is computed by geometric inference
based on the distances between the anchor nodes and
the node itself. However, the distance is not measured
directly; instead, it is derived by knowing the speed
of the transmission signal, and by measuring the time
needed to get an answer to a beacon message sent to U .
Unfortunately, if this computation were carried on
without any precaution, U might fool the anchors by
delaying the beacon message. However, since in most
settings a malicious node can delay the answer beacon,
but not speed it up, under some conditions it is possible
to spot malicious behaviors. VM uses three or more
anchor nodes to detect misbehaving nodes. In VM the
1. Preliminary versions of these results are published in [14] and [15].
anchor nodes work as verifiers of the localization data
and they send to the sink node B the information needed
to evaluate the consistency of the coordinates computed
for U . The basic idea of VM is: each verifier Vi computes
its distance bound dbi [16] to U ; any point P 6= U inside
the triangle formed by V1V2V3 has necessarily at least one
distance to the Vi enlarged. This enlargement, however,
cannot be masked by U by sending a faster message to
the corresponding verifier.
Under the hypothesis that verifiers are trusted and
they can securely communicate with B, the following
verification process can be used to check the localization
data in a setting in which signals cannot be accelerated:
Step 1. Each verifier Vi sends a beacon message to U
and records the time τi needed to get an answer;
Step 2. Each verifier Vi (whose coordinates 〈xi, yi〉 are
known) sends to B a message with its τi;
Step 3. From τi, B derives the corresponding distance
bound dbi (that can be easily computed if the speed of
the signal is known) and it estimates U ’s coordinates by
minimizing the sum of squared errors
ǫ =
∑
i
(dbi −
√
(xU − xi)2 + (yU − yi)2)2 (1)
where 〈xU , yU 〉 are the coordinates to be estimated2;
Step 4. B can now check if 〈xU , yU 〉 are feasible in the
given setting by two incremental tests: (a) δ test: For
all verifiers Vi, compute the distance between the esti-
mated U and Vi: if it differs from the measured distance
bound by more than the expected distance measurement
error, the estimation is affected by malicious tampering;
(b) point-in-the-triangle test: Distance bounds are reliable
only if the estimated U is within at least one verification
triangle formed by a triplet of verifiers, otherwise the
estimation is considered unverified.
If both the δ and the point-in-the-triangle tests are
positive, the distance bounds are consistent with the
estimated node position, which moreover falls in at
least one verification triangle. This implies that none of
the distance bounds were enlarged. Thus, the sink can
consider the estimated position of the node as ROBUST;
if instead one of the tests fails, the information at hands
is not sufficient to support the reliability of the data. An
estimation that does not pass the δ test is considered
MALICIOUS. In all the other cases, the sink marks the es-
timation as UNKNOWN. In an ideal situation where there
are no measurement errors, there are neither malevolent
nodes marked as ROBUST, nor benevolent ones marked
as MALICIOUS. Even in this ideal setting, however, there
are UNKNOWN nodes, that could be malevolent or not.
In other words, there are no sufficient information for
evaluating the trustworthiness of a node position. In
fact, U could pretend, by an opportune manipulation of
2. In an ideal situation where there are no measurement errors
and/or malicious delays, this is equivalent to finding the (unique)
intersection of the circles defined by the distance bounds and centered
in the Vi and ǫ = 0. In general, the above computation in presence of
errors is not trivial; we point an interested reader to [17].
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delays, to be in a position P that is credible to be taken
into account. No such points exist inside the triangles
formed by the verifiers (this is exactly the idea behind
VM), but outside them some regions are still compatible
with all the information verifiers have.
Consider |V | verifiers that are able to send signals in
a range R. Let xU and yU be the real coordinates of U .
They are unknown to the verifiers, but nevertheless they
put a constraint on plausible fake positions, since the
forged distance bound to Vi must be greater than the
length of UVi. Thus, any point P = 〈xi, yi〉 that is a
plausible falsification of U has to agree to the following
constraints, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ |V |:{
(y − yi)2 + (x− xi)2 < R2
(y − yi)2 + (x− xi)2 > (yU − yi)2 + (xU − xi)2 (2)
The constraints in (2) can be understood better by
looking at Fig. 1, where three verifiers are depicted: the
green area around each verifier denotes its power range,
and the red area is the bound on the distance that U
can put forward credibly. Thus, any plausible P must
lay outside every red region and inside every green one
(and, of course, outside every triangle of verifiers).
VM is suitable to be used only when the attacker
can only enlarge distances: this requires the absence of
collusion between malicious nodes, since coalitions can
undertake joint strategies for speeding up of messages,
thus violating the assumptions used to classify nodes
as malicious via distance bounds and geometric infer-
ence [12]. In this work, we consider settings where
malicious nodes are independent. Dealing with collusion
would require to adopt VM refinements or to develop
alternative methods (see [18] for further discussion).
V1 V2
V3
UP
Fig. 1. Plausible falsification region: P is a plausible fake
position for U since it lays outside every red region and
inside every green one whose radius is R (moreover it is
outside the triangle of verifiers).
3 SECURE LOCALIZATION GAMES
Our approach models the interaction between indepen-
dent malicious nodes and verifiers as a non-cooperative
game. For the sake of presentation, we restrict our atten-
tion to a game played between a group of verifiers and
a single malicious node. Handling multiple independent
nodes would call for simple extensions and scalings
of the model we present here. We will provide some
insights along this direction in the following sections. In
the game we consider, the malicious node acts to mas-
querade itself as an unknown node while the verifiers
try to face the malicious node at best.
A game is described by a tuple 〈mechanism, strategies〉:
mechanism defines the rules of the game in terms of num-
ber of players, actions available to the players, outcomes
of actions interplay, utility functions of players; strategies
describe the behaviors of the players during the game in
terms of played actions. Strategies can be pure, when a
player performs one action with a probability of one, or
they can be mixed, when a player randomizes over a set
of actions. The players’ strategies define an outcome (if
the strategies are pure) or a lottery over the outcomes
(if mixed). Players have preferences over the outcomes
expressed by utility functions and each player is rational.
Solving a game means to find a profile of strategies
(i.e., a set specifying one strategy for each player) such
that the players’ strategies are somehow in equilibrium.
The most known equilibrium concept is Nash [13] where
each player cannot improve its utility by unilaterally
deviating.
We now formally state our secure localization game
by focusing on a setting with |V | = 3 verifiers (the min-
imum number needed to apply VM) and one malicious
node. A secure localization game is a tuple 〈Q,A, U〉. Set
Q contains the players: a defender v who controls the
verifiers and a malicious player m who controls the
unknown nodes, thus Q = {v,m}. Set A contains the
actions available to players. Given a surface S ⊆ R2, the
actions available to v are all the possible tuples of posi-
tions 〈V1, V2, V3〉 of the three verifiers with V1, V2, V3 ∈ S,
while the actions available to m are all the possible
pairs of positions 〈U,P 〉 with U,P ∈ S (where U and
P are defined in the previous section). We denote by
σv the strategy (possibly mixed) of v and by σm the
strategy (possibly mixed) of m. Given a strategy profile
σ = (σv, σm) in pure strategies, it is possible to check
whether or not constraints (2) are satisfied. The outcomes
of the game can be {MALICIOUS, ROBUST, UNKNOWN}.
Set U contains the players’ utility functions, denoted
uv(·) and um(·) respectively, that define their preferences
over the outcomes. We define (the verifier is indifferent
among the outcomes {MALICIOUS, ROBUST} since both
rule out any malicious influence) ui(MALICIOUS) =
ui(ROBUST) = 0 for i ∈ Q, while ui(UNKNOWN) can
be defined differently according to different criteria. A
simple criterion could be to assign uv(UNKNOWN) = −1
and um(UNKNOWN) = 1. However, our intuition is
that the UNKNOWN outcomes are not the same for the
players, because m could prefer those in which the
distance between U and P is maximum. The criterion we
adopt in this paper to characterize UNKNOWN outcomes
is maximum deception where um is defined as the distance
between U and P , while uv is defined as the opposite.
Other interesting criteria non-explored in this paper are
deception area where um is defined as the size of the
region S′ ⊆ S such that P ∈ S′ is marked as UNKNOWN,
while uv is defined as the opposite. Another one is the
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deception shape where um is defined as the number of
disconnected regions S′ ⊆ S such that P ∈ S′ is marked
as UNKNOWN, while uv is defined as the opposite.
Players could even use different criteria, e.g., v and m
could adopt the maximum deception criterion and the
deception shape respectively. However, when players
adopt the same criterion, the game is zero-sum, the sum
of the players’ utilities being zero, and its resolution is
tractable.
4 PLACEMENT OF VERIFIERS
In this section, we study the optimal placement of the
verifiers in order to minimize the maximum deception.
The results presented here apply to any node indi-
vidually trying to fake its position. Therefore, they do
not depend on the number of malicious nodes in the
environment.
4.1 Maxmin Solution with Three Verifiers
We focus on the case with three verifiers. In our analysis
of the game, we consider only the case in which
ViVj ≤ R 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3, i 6= j (3)
Indeed, if we allow ViVj > R, then there will be several
unreasonable equilibria. For instance, an optimal veri-
fiers’ strategy would prescribe that the verifiers must be
positioned such that only one point satisfies constraints
(2). This strategy would assure the verifiers the largest
utility (i.e., zero), no UNKNOWN positions being possible.
However, this setting is not interesting, since the total
area monitored by the verifiers collapses in one point.
At first, we can show that for each action of the
verifiers—under the assumption (3)—there exists an ac-
tion of the malicious node such that this is marked as
UNKNOWN. Therefore, there is no verifiers’ strategy such
that, for all the malicious node’s actions, the malicious
node is marked as ROBUST or MALICIOUS.
Theorem 1. For each tuple 〈V1, V2, V3〉 such that ViVj ≤ R
for all i, j, there exists at least a pair 〈U,P 〉 such that um > 0.
Proof: Given V1, V2, V3 such that ViVj ≤ R for
all i, j, choose a Vi and call X the point on the line
VkVj (k, j 6= i) closest to Vi. Assign U = X . Consider
the line connecting Vi to X , assign P to be any point
X ′ on this line such that ViX ≤ ViX ′ ≤ R. Then, by
construction um > 0.
We discuss what is the configuration of the three
verifiers such that the maximum deception is minimized.
Theorem 2. Any tuple 〈V1, V2, V3〉 such that ViVj = R for
all i, j minimizes the maximum deception.
Proof: Since we need to minimize the maximum
distance between two points, by symmetry, the triangle
whose vertexes are V1, V2, V3 must have all the edges
with the same length. We show that ViVj = R. It can be
easily seen, by geometric construction, that U must be
necessarily inside the triangle. As shown in Section 2, P
must be necessarily outside the triangle and, by defini-
tion, the optimal P will be on the boundary constituted
by some circle with center at some Vi and range equal to
R (otherwise P could be moved farther and P would not
be optimal). As ViVj decreases, the size of the triangle
reduces, while the boundary is unchanged, and therefore
UP does not decrease.
Theorem 3. Let W be the orthocenter of the triangle V1V2V3.
The malicious node’s best responses have polar coordinates3
U = (ρ = 2
√
3
3 − 1, θ = 3pi2 ) and P = (ρ = (1 −
√
3
3 )R, θ =
3pi
2 ) w.r.t. pole W (ρVi = 0), for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. The best maximum
deception is UP = (2−√3).
Proof: Consider point P in Fig. 2. Any unknown U
who pretended to be in P must be located inside the blue
circles with centers in the Vi and radii ViP , otherwise the
fake distance ViP would be greater than the real one ViU .
Thus, given P , the farthest U is the other intersection of
two circles with centers on the endpoints Vi, Vj of the
triangle edge at the same distance of P from the edge.
The distance UP is maximal when the angle w.r.t. pole
W (ρVi = 0) is
3pi
2 and P lays on the edge of the power
range of Vk, k 6= i, k 6= j. In this case VkP = R and
UP = 2(R−
√
3
2 R) = (2−
√
3)R = 0.2679R.
V1 V2
V3
P
U
P
U
Fig. 2. The farthest U pretending to be in position P .
The value of um (i.e., the maximum deception) is then
0.2679R. In other words, when the verifiers compose an
equilateral triangle, a malicious node can masquerade as
unknown and the maximum deception is about 27% of
the verifiers’ range R. Interestingly, with this configura-
tion, the area monitored by all the landmark nodes is the
area of the circular triangle [19]
√
3
4 R
2+ 32 (
pi
3 −sin(pi3 ))R2,
thus the portion of the region in which VM is effective
(i.e., the area of the triangle V1V2V3) is
√
3R2
4
(pi−√3)R2
2
≈ 61%.
4.2 Maximum Deception with Multiple Verifiers
The results exposed in Section 4.1 are the basis to study
situations with multiple (more than three) verifiers. Our
main result is the derivation of a bound between the
maximum deception and the number of verifiers.
3. U and P can be expressed more easily with polar coordinates with
origin in W , ρV = 0.
NICOLA BASILICO ET AL. 5
V1 V2
V3
U
P
(a)
V1 V2
V3
W
U
P
U
P
U
P
(b)
Fig. 3. Malicious node’s best responses (maximum de-
ception is UP = 0.2679R).
V1 V2
V3 V4
UP
(a) Max deception with
4 verifiers is still 26.7%R
V1 V2
V3
(b) U positions that al-
lows for plausible Ps
Fig. 4. Impact of verifiers on U ability to fake positions.
Initially, consider the simple situation in which we
have four verifiers and they constitute two adjacent
equilateral triangles as shown in Fig. 4(a). The maximum
deception does not change w.r.t. the case with three
verifiers, since some of the best responses depicted in
Fig. 3(b) are still available. Indeed, the fourth verifier
is useful to rule out only the two positions that are on
the edge V4 faces: on this side any fake P would surely
be marked as MALICIOUS (or even ROBUST if P ≡ U )
since it would be inside the triangle V2V3V4. The proof
is straightforward. Consider (w.l.o.g.) the triangle V1V2V3
in Fig. 4(a). In order for a node not to be marked as
MALICIOUS, U must be in the areas depicted in Fig. 4(b).
Moreover, any plausible P cannot be neither inside the
triangle V1V2V3 nor inside the triangle V2V3V4, otherwise
the node would be marked as MALICIOUS. Indeed, any
plausible fake P , given a U in the blue area between
V2 and V3 (see Fig. 4(b)), cannot be in regions that are
outside both the triangles V1V2V3 and V2V3V4.
The above observation can be leveraged to give a
bound over the maximum deception with a given num-
ber of verifiers opportunely placed and tuned such that
the shape of the area they monitor is a triangle.
Theorem 4. Given a triangular area, in order to have a
maximum deception not larger than 0.2679R
2k
we need at least
2 +
∑k
j=0 3
j verifiers.
Proof: Consider the basic case with three verifiers
(composing an equilateral triangle) with range R and
ViVj = R. As shown in Section 4.1 the maximum
deception is 0.2679R. Let us add now three verifiers
V1 V2
V3
V4 V5
V6
Fig. 5. Max deception with 6 verifiers is UP = 0.2679R2 .
such that we have four equilateral triangles with edge
R
2 as shown in Fig. 5. The range of all the verifiers is
set equal to R2 (i.e., they could just ignore any beacon
message that takes longer than needed to cover the
distance R2 ). Since the edge of the small triangles is
now R2 , the maximum deception here is
0.2679R
2 and no
U positions are possible in the central triangle V4V5V6.
Indeed, all the edges of the central triangle are adjacent
to the edge of other triangles. This last result allows
us not to consider the central triangle when we want
to reduce the maximal deception, the malicious node
never positioning itself within it. The basic idea is that
if we want to halve the maximum deception we need to
decompose all the triangles vulnerable to the malicious
node by introducing three verifiers. By introducing three
new verifiers per triangle we obtain four sub-triangles
with an edge that is half of the original triangle and
therefore the maximum deception is halved. In general,
in order to have a maximum deception of 0.2679R
2k
, the
number of required verifiers4 is 32 (1 + 3
k), as shown in
Table 6(b). In Fig. 6(a), we report an example with k = 2
and 15 verifiers. Notice that, when we introduce new
verifiers, we need to halve the range. In general, we will
have verifiers with multiple different ranges.
(a) 15 verifiers (k = 2) give a
max deception 0.06698R
(b) max deception
k |V | max. deception
0 3 0.2679R
1 6 0.134R
2 15 0.06698R
3 42 0.03349R
4 123 0.01674R
5 366 8.372 · 10−3R
Fig. 6. Max deception is reduced by adding verifiers.
The number of verifiers increases according to
the formula |V |k = |V |k−1 + 3k. Asymptotically
limk→∞
|V |k+1
|V |k = 3, thus we need to multiply by three
the number of verifiers to divide by two the maximum
deception. Increasing the number of verifiers requires
4. The number of vertices in Sierpinski triangle of order k; see [20].
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to add new verifiers with a smaller range w.r.t. those
already present in the network.
5 CHASING MALICIOUSNESS
We now consider the case in which we have three
deployed verifiers that monitor a given area S and
a number n of unknown nodes, among which one is
malicious. According to Theorem 3, the malicious node
should pretend to be in one of three possible positions.
However, if non-malicious nodes can appear in every
position of the monitored area with a given probability
distribution, excluded for degenerate probability dis-
tributions, the probability with which a non-malicious
node will appear in the positions that the malicious
node must pretend according to Theorem 3 is zero.
Therefore, the verifiers, once the positions of all the
nodes have been observed, can mark the node in the
position prescribed by Theorem 3 as malicious. As a
result, the malicious node could be interested in chang-
ing its strategy, randomizing over a number of different
positions, to masquerade its position as the position of a
non-malicious node. To address this problem, we studied
a new security game in which at most one of the n nodes
is malicious and v might physically inspect one of the
unknown nodes to spot if it is malicious. However, we
assume that the defender has limited resources and only
one node can be controlled directly, thus v is interested in a
proper estimation of the probability of maliciousness of
the unknown node.
V1 V2
V3
P1P2
Fig. 7. Two unknown nodes monitored by three verifiers.
Let’s analyze the scenario depicted in Fig. 7: we have
three verifiers that, according to Theorem 2, were de-
ployed on an equilateral triangle of edge R. They sense
the beacons of unknown nodes Ui (not present in the
figure) and compute their positions Pi (1 ≤ i ≤ n). At
most one Ui is malicious: only if it is, the computed
position is fake. The questions are: given a number of
nodes, with which probability each node is malicious?
Morevoer, what is the strategy of the malicious node that
masquerades at best its position?
5.1 Game model
We divide the area S in a finite number |S| of subregions
each identified with its centroid {y1, . . . ,y|S|}. This dis-
cretization process is necessary to make the game model
solvable in practice (a generic game with continuous ac-
tions cannot be solved exactly and approximate solutions
can be found only with very small problems [13]). We
describe the game by referring to its extensive form, i.e.,
players act by alternating their moves, thus the game
can be represented by a game tree in which the vertices
are decision points of the players and the edges are the
actions available to a player at a given decision point. We
also introduce a non-strategic player, known as nature
in the game theoretic jargon, here denoted by N : it
plays only the first move and gains no utility in the
game. The game is defined by the tuple 〈Q,A,U〉, where
Q = {v,m,N} are the players, A = {Ai}i∈Q the actions,
and U the utility functions for players v and m.
The mechanism defines a game tree G, whose non-
terminal vertices are in V and the terminal ones in T .
Function ι : V → Q returns the player that plays at a
given vertex, while function χ : V → A returns the set of
actions available at vertex i to player ι(i). The game tree
is defined by the function ν : V × {Ai}i∈Q → V ∪ T that
returns the next vertex given the current vertex and one
of the possible actions according to χ and ι. Vertices are
grouped in information sets: two vertices i, j ∈ V are in
the same information set H if χ(i) = χ(j)∧ι(i) = ι(j) and
the player knows that it is playing in i or j, but it cannot
recognize the specific vertex in which it is playing.
For simplicity, we assume that there is always one
malicious node. The structure of the game is as follows.
Nature. In the root vertex, according to function ι, the
nature N plays first; according to χ the available actions
AN are all the possible assignments yi of the n − 1
(non-malicious) nodes to the sub-regions of S. Players
can only observe which regions are occupied by nodes
(without distinguishing the nodes), thus we can safely
restrict ourselves to
(|S|+(n−1)−1
n−1
)
actions, the number of
combinations (with repetitions) of n − 1 elements out
of |S|. N chooses its action according to a probability
distribution Ω over AN .
Malicious node. According to function ν, each action
of N leads to a different vertex in which, according
to function ι, the malicious player m plays one of the
actions determined by χ. We assume that m cannot
observe the nature’s moves and therefore all the decision
vertices in which the malicious player acts constitute a
unique information set Hm. The available actions Am
are all the possible assignments of the malicious node to
a position x ∈ S and of its fake position to yˆ ∈ S. As
discussed in detail below, we can safely consider just the
fake positions yˆ and therefore |Am| = |S|. We denote by
σm(yˆ) the strategy of m, expressing the probability with
which m places the malicious node such that the fake
position is yˆ.
Verifiers. According to function ν, each action of m
leads to a different vertex in which, according to function
ι, the verifier player v acts one of the actions determined
by χ. This player observes the positions of all the nodes
without knowing which are malicious or non-malicious,
thus equivalent cases (v distinguishes only the assign-
ments to regions) are grouped in proper information sets.
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The number of information sets is
(|S|+n−1
n
)
5. We denote
the i-th information set by Hv.i. At each information
set, the set of actions Av available to the verifier player
are the choices of a node (to further inspect) in one of
the observed positions. We denote by σv(Hv.i, y¯) the
strategy of v in information set Hv.i expressing the
probability with which it chooses the node in position
y, given that y is an observed position (v can adopt a
different strategy at each information set). The number
of actions changes according to the information set since
the number of observed positions can vary (recall that
two nodes can be in the same position). The largest
number of actions at a given information set is n. Since
the positions are not distinguishable by the verifier, the
actual node to be inspected is determined according to
a uniform probability, i.e., any node will be chosen with
probability σv(Hv.i,y)|H| . Thus, in all the information sets
where all the nodes (non-malicious and malicious) are
in the same position, the probability with which any
specific node will be chosen is 1
n
. In these information
sets, the strategy of the verifier is fixed.
The utility functions are defined on terminal nodes T
and depend on the capture of the malicious node.
• capture: um = 0 and uv = 1;
• non-capture: uv = 0 and um = ∆(yˆ) where ∆(yˆ) is
the max deception given by the fake position yˆ.
Notice that the new obtained game is now general-sum.
Given that each player behaves as a maximizer of the
expected utility, for each fake position yˆ the malicious
node will choose the position such that the deception
is maximum and therefore, as anticipated above, we can
safely reduce the set of actions of the malicious player to
exclusively the fake positions. When the players adopt
mixed strategies, randomizing over their actions, their
utility is defined in expectation over the outcomes as
prescribed in [21].
To clarify the notation, Fig. 8 depicts the game tree of
the following example.
Example 1. We have |S| = 3 with S = {x1,x2,x3} and n = 2
(one malicious and one non-malicious). The game formalization (to
read together with Fig. 8) follows.
Q , {N ,m,v}
A , {AN ,Am,Av}
where AN = {y1,y2,y3},Am = {yˆ1, yˆ2, yˆ3},Av = {y¯1, y¯2, y¯3}
V , {•0, •0.1, •0.2, •0.3, •0.1.2, •0.1.3, •0.2.1, •0.2.3, •0.3.1, •0.3.2}
T , ∀i 6= j : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3, {•0.i.j.c, •0.i.j.c¯}
∀i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, {•0.i.i}
ι , •0 → N
∀i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, •0.i →m
∀i, j : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3, •0.i.j → v
χ , •0 → AN
5. For instance, suppose that there are two nodes (one
malicious and one non-malicious) and three possible positions
{y1,y2,y3}, the number of information sets is six, one for
each of the following possible combinations of two nodes
{y1,y1}, {y1,y2}, {y1,y3}, {y2,y2}, {y2,y3}, {y3,y3} since v
cannot distinguish between {y1, yˆ2} and {yˆ2,y1}: thus both choices
are equivalent to a generic {y1,y2}.
∀i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, •0.i → Am
∀i, j : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3, •0.i.j → {y¯i, y¯j}
ν , ∀i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, (•0,yi)→ •0.i
∀i, j : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3, (•0.i, yˆj)→ •0.i.j
∀i 6= j : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3, (•0.i.j , y¯j)→ •0.i.j.c
∀i 6= j : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3, (•0.i.j , y¯i)→ •0.i.j.c¯
∀i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, (•0.i.i, y¯i)→ •0.i.i
H , {Hm,Hv.1,Hv.2,Hv.3}
where Hm = {•0.1, •0.2, •0.3},
Hv.1 = {•0.1.2, •0.2.1},Hv.2 = {•0.1.3, •0.3.1},
Hv.3 = {•0.2.3, •0.3.2}
u , ∀i 6= j : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3, •0.i.j.c → (−, 0, 1)
∀i 6= j : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3, •0.i.j.c¯ → (−,∆(yˆi), 0)
∀i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, •0.i.i → (−,
1
2
∆(yˆi),
1
2
)
Nature N places n − 1 = 1 non-malicious nodes on a position
and then m acts by choosing the only fake position. In Fig. 8,
all the decision points of the malicious player are connected by a
dashed line because they all constitute a unique information set Hm.
In all the situations in which the two nodes (the malicious one
and the non-malicious one) are in the same observed position we
have a terminal node because the strategy of the verifier player is
determined by a 1
2
probability of choosing the malicious node (and
same probability for the non-malicious one). The expected utilities are
um =
1
2
∆(yˆi), uv =
1
2
. In the other situations, v has two possible
actions. For instance, the verifier cannot distinguish the situation
in which the malicious node has chosen yˆ1 and the non-malicious
node has been placed by nature in y2 from the reverse situation.
Therefore, these two situations constitute a unique information set
(Hv.1). Consider, as an example, yˆ1 and y2 as the positions of
the malicious and non-malicious nodes respectively, if the verifier
chooses y¯1, the malicious node will be captured (uv = 1), instead,
if the verifier chooses y¯2, the malicious node will not be captured
(um = ∆(yˆ1)).
5.2 Solution concepts and equilibrium constraints
We consider in this section two solution concepts for
our game model. The maxmin strategy and the Nash
equilibrium. The maxmin strategy gives the maximum
utility against the strongest opponent, therefore, the util-
ity provided by the maxmin strategy is a lower bound.
The maxmin value is known also as the security level
of a player. The computation of a maxmin strategy is
easy, requiring polynomial time in the size of the game.
The Nash equilibrium is the most appropriate solution
concept for general-sum games, but its computation is
not easy in the worst case.6
5.2.1 Security levels and strategies
Initially, we focus on the maxmin value of the verifier
player. For simplicity, we compute it by finding the
minmax strategy of the malicious player (i.e., the dual
strategy of the verifier player’s maxmin strategy). The
verifier player’s maxmin value is given by the following
6. When a game is zero-sum, the pair maxmin strategies is certainly
also a Nash equilibrium, while there is no guarantee with general-
sum games: computing a Nash equilibrium for a general-sum game is
PPAD-complete and, although P ⊆ PPAD ⊆ NP and therefore it could
be the case PPAD ⊂ NP, it is commonly believed that computing a
Nash equilibrium is exponential in the worst case [13].
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Fig. 8. The game tree with n = 2 and |S| = 3 (see Example 1).
linear mathematical programming problem, where u∗
v
(h)
denotes the value of the verifier players’ optimal action
at information set h. This, together with σm, are the vari-
ables of the linear programming problem we formulate.
minimize
u∗
v
,σm
∑
h∈H
u∗
v
(h) +
∑
1≤i≤|S|
1
2
Ω(yi) · σm(yˆi) (4)
subject to u∗
v
(h) ≥ σm(yˆi) · Ω(yj) yˆi,yj ∈ h, i 6= j (5)∑
1≤i≤|S|
σm(yˆi) = 1 (6)
σm(yˆi) ≥ 0 1 ≤ i ≤ |S| (7)
The objective function (4) is written for n = 2; when
n is greater, the second part is more complex: in fact,
one has to consider all the cases in which m plays a
fake position already used one or more times by N 7.
Constraints (5) assure that u∗
v
(h) is larger than the value
given by every action available at h; constraints (6)–(7)
assure that strategy σm is well defined. Interestingly, the
malicious player’s minmax strategy matches the proba-
bility distribution Ω according to which non-malicious
nodes are placed, as shown by the following lemma.
Lemma 1. With one non-malicious node, the malicious
player’s minmax strategy is σm(yˆi) = Ω(yi) for all 1 ≤
i ≤ |S| and the verifier player’s maxmin value is 12 .
Proof: When σm(yˆi) = Ω(yi) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |S|,
function (4) is equal to 12 for every possible Ω. Indeed, the
second term of the objective function is
∑
1≤i≤|S|
1
2Ω(yi)·
Ω(yi), and the first term, by constraint (5), becomes∑
h∈H u
∗
v
(h) =
∑
1≤i,j≤|S|∧i 6=j Ω(yi) · Ω(yj). The sum of
these two terms is equal to 12 (
∑
1≤i≤|S| Ω(yi))
2 that is,
by definition of Ω, equal to 12 . It can be easily shown
that it is a minimum because, when σm(yˆ) is increased
by ξ, reducing for example σm(yˆj), then the objective
function increases by ξ · (1− 12Ω(yi)− 12Ω(yj)) (a strictly
positive value). Thus, 12 is the minimum.
This result shows that the verifier will always choose
the malicious node with at least a probability of 12 .
With more than one non-malicious node, the result is
7. For example, with n = 3 the term becomes:∑
1≤i≤|S|
1
3
Ω(yiyi)σ(yˆi) +
∑
1≤i,j≤|S|∧i 6=j
1
2
Ω(yiyj)σ(yˆi).
analogous (we omit the proof, being the same of the case
with a single non-malicious node).
Lemma 2. With n − 1 non-malicious nodes, the malicious
player’s minmax strategy is σm(yˆi) = Ω(yi) for all 1 ≤ i ≤
|S| and the verifier player’s maxmin value is 1
n
.
Similarly, we can compute the maxmin value for the
malicious player by the following linear program:
minimize u∗
m
(8)
subject to
1≤i≤|S|
u∗
m
≥ ∆(yˆi) ·


1
2
Ω(yi) +
∑
{y¯i,y¯j}∈H
y¯i 6=y¯j
Ω(yj)σv(h, y¯j)

 (9)
∑
y¯k∈h
σv(h, y¯k) = 1 ∀h ∈ H (10)
σv(h, y¯i) ≥ 0 y¯i ∈ h (11)
Constraints (9) force the maxmin value u∗
m
to be larger
than the expected utility given by every action of the
malicious player; constraints (10) and (11) assure that
σv is a well defined strategy. In this case, the verifier
player’s minmax strategy is not trivial, as instead it is
above in the case of the malicious player. Therefore,
also the case with more non-malicious nodes is more
complicated and requires a different linear formulation
of constraints (9) to capture all the possible assignments
of non-malicious nodes to positions. In this case, the
size of the game tree rises exponentially in the number
of non-malicious nodes and therefore, although maxmin
strategy can be computed in polynomial time in the size
of the game, the maxmin computation is exponential in
the number of non-malicious nodes.
5.2.2 Nash equilibria
Under the assumption that each single player knows
the payoffs of the opponent and knows the probability
distribution associated with which the non-malicious
nodes place in the positions, the appropriate solution
concept is the Nash equilibrium.
Initially, we study the situation in which there is a
single non-malicious node and, subsequently, we discuss
how to extend it to the general case.
We can formulate the equilibrium constraints for find-
ing a Nash equilibrium as a mixed-integer linear mathe-
matical programming problem as follows. Call Hv the
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set of information sets of the verifier player and h a
single information set, defined as the pair of observed
positions of two nodes, i.e., h = {y¯i, y¯j}; we have:
um(y¯i) = ∆(yi)


1
2
Ω(yi) +
∑
{y¯i,y¯j}∈H
y¯j 6=y¯i
Ω(yj)σv(h, y¯j)

 1 ≤ i ≤ |S| (12)
u∗
m
≥ u∗
v
(y¯i) 1 ≤ i ≤ |S| (13)
u∗
m
≤ u∗
v
(y¯i) + ∆∞ · (1− si) 1 ≤ i ≤ |S| (14)∑
1≤i≤|S|
si ≥ 1 1 ≤ i ≤ |S| (15)
si ∈ {0, 1} 1 ≤ i ≤ |S| (16)
σv(h, y¯i) ≤ si + 1− sj y¯i, y¯j ∈ h, i 6= j (17)∑
y¯i∈h
σv(h, y¯i) = 1 y¯i ∈ h, h ∈ Hv (18)
σv(h, y¯i) ≥ 0 y¯i ∈ h, h ∈ Hv (19)
In these formulae si are slack variables that will be
equal to one if the malicious player takes action yˆi
with positive probability. Parameter ∆∞ is defined as
∆∞ = max1≤i≤|S|∆(yˆi): thus it plays the role of infinity
when on the right side of a ‘≤’ inequality. The size of the
above mathematical program is O(|S|2), both in terms of
number of variables and number of constraints.
The above formulation is inspired to the formula-
tion presented in [22] based on a mixed integer-linear
problem (MILP), but it is much more compact. In the
original formulation, one binary variable per action for
each player is needed: in our case |S| + |S|2 binary
variables and unfortunately the hardness of a MILP is
due to the presence of integer variables.8 Instead, our
formulation uses only |S| binary variables and therefore
we dramatically improved the efficiency by 2|S|
2
.
We can state the following theorem.
Theorem 5. For every solution (u∗
m
, u∗
v
, σv, s) of the feasibil-
ity problem composed of constraints (12)–(19), we can derive a
Nash equilibrium (σ∗
v
, σ∗
m
) where the verifier player’s optimal
strategy is defined as σ∗
v
= σv and, called
σ˜m(yˆi) =
{
0 if si = 0
Ω(yi) otherwise
the malicious player’s optimal strategy is defined as σ∗
m
(yˆi) =
σ˜m(yˆi)∑
1≤i≤|S| σ˜m(yˆi)
.
Proof: Constraints (12) force each u∗
v
(y¯i) to be equal
to the expected utility the malicious player receives from
undertaking action yˆi. Constraints (13) and (14) force u
∗
m
to be equal to the expected utility of the best actions of
the malicious player and force si = 0 (i.e., they force
the malicious player not to play action yˆi) for each non-
optimal action yˆi (i.e., those with u
∗
v
(y¯i) < u
∗
m
(yˆi)).
Constraints (15) assure that the malicious player plays
at least one action yˆi, given that constraints (16) force
variables si to be binary. Therefore, constraints (12)–(16)
8. More precisely, MILP techniques create a branch-and-bound tree
whose size rises exponentially in the number of binary variables.
constitute the equilibrium constraints for the malicious
player, forcing the player to play only its best responses.
Thus, every action yˆi such that si = 1 will be played
with a positive probability in a Nash equilibrium. Con-
straints (17) force every strategy σv(h, y¯i) to be zero only
if y¯i is not played and y¯j is played. The basic idea is
that, if yˆi is not played, then the verifier player will
never choose a node in position y¯i, except for all the
cases in which the malicious player will never play both
positions y¯i, y¯j composing an information set. In these
last cases (never reachable along the equilibrium path),
the strategy of the verifier player is arbitrary. Thus, if
only a position yˆi of an information set h is played
by the malicious player, then the verifier player will
play such position with a probability of one and vice-
versa. Instead, if both positions of an information set are
played by the malicious player, then verifier player will
randomize over them. The constraints over the malicious
player strategies such that verifier player can randomize
over the two choices y¯i, y¯j of an information set is that
σm(yˆi)
Ω(yi)
= σm(yˆi)Ω(yj) , i.e., it is equiprobable that the malicious
player is in both positions. Therefore, since the malicious
player strategy can be easily derived from the si, it
can be omitted from the equilibrium constraint problem.
Finally, constraints (18) and (19) force strategies σv(h, y¯i)
to be well defined in every information set.
The above theoretical results show that the strategy of
the malicious player is equal to Ω except for a truncation
(some positions are not played by the malicious player)
and the normalization of the probability to one. Interest-
ingly, some game instances can admit Nash equilibria in
pure strategies. We report some examples.
Example 2. Suppose that |S| = 3 and that Ω(y1) = Ω(y2) =
Ω(y3) =
1
3
. We report in the following table how the Nash
equilibrium strategies change as the values of ∆ change in five
different settings.
# 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5
∆(yˆ1) 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00
∆(yˆ2) 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00
∆(yˆ3) 1.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 1.00
σm(yˆ1) 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.33
σm(yˆ2) 0.33 0.33 0.50 0.00 0.33
σm(yˆ3) 0.33 0.33 0.50 1.00 0.33
σv(Hv.1, y¯1) 1.00 0.05 0.00 0.50 0.6
σv(Hv.1, y¯2) 0.00 0.95 1.00 0.50 0.4
σv(Hv.2, y¯1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75
σv(Hv.2, y¯3) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.25
σv(Hv.3, y¯2) 1.00 0.32 0.30 0.00 1.00
σv(Hv.3, y¯3) 0.00 0.68 0.70 1.00 0.00
It can be observed that: when all the positions have the same
deception, then (as expected) the strategy of the malicious node is
uniform over its action; when a location has a value of zero, the
malicious node does not play such an action; when a location has a
value remarkably larger than the others’ value, the malicious node
plays that action with probability of one.
Given that a game can admit multiple Nash equilibria,
it can be useful to characterize the range of equilibria.
We can achieve this task by exploiting formulation (12)–
(19) together with a linear objective function. More pre-
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cisely, we can study the range of Nash equilibria by
finding the equilibrium maximizing the expected utility
of the malicious node and the equilibrium minimizing
the same objective function. Every other equilibrium
will be in the middle. The two extreme equilibria can
be found by solving (12)–(19) with the maximization
and minimization, respectively, of u∗
m
. The two resulting
mathematical programs are MILP.
With more non-malicious nodes, the mathematical
program (12)–(19) is more complicated and depends on
n. We provide the program with n = 3:
um(y¯i) = ∆(yi) ·
(1
3
Ω(yi)
2 +
∑
j 6=i
Ω(yj)
2 · σv(y¯i, y¯j , y¯j)
+2
∑
j 6=i
Ω(yi) · Ω(yj) ·
(
1−
1
2
σv(y¯i, y¯j , y¯i)
)
+
∑
j 6=i
∑
k 6=j,k 6=i
Ω(yj) · Ω(yk) ·
(
1− σv(y¯k, y¯j , y¯i)
))
(20)
u∗
m
≥ um(y¯i) (21)
u∗
m
≤ um(y¯i) + ∆∞ · (1− si) (22)∑
1≤i≤|S|
si ≥ 1 (23)
σv(yi,yj ,yk) = σv(yj ,yi,yk) (24)
σv(yj ,yi,yi) = σv(yj ,yj ,yi) (25)
σv(yi,yj ,yk) + σv(yi,yk,yj) + σv(yk,yj ,yi) = 1 (26)
σv(yi,yj ,yi) + σv(yi,yj ,yj) = 1 (27)
σv(yi,yj ,yi) ≤ si + 1− sj (28)
σv(yi,yi,yj) ≤ sj + 1− si (29)
σv(yi,yj ,yk) ≤ sk + 1− ri,j (30)
ri,j ≥ si (31)
ri,j ≥ sj (32)
ri,j ≤ si + sj (33)
si ∈ {0, 1} (34)
ri,j ∈ {0, 1} (35)
1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ |S| i 6= j, i 6= k, j 6= k (36)
The above program is similar to (12)–(19). Con-
straints (20)–(23) are the analogous of (12)–(15). Con-
straints (24)–(27) enforce the consistency of the verifier’s
strategies. Constraints (28)–(30) are the analogous of
constraints (17). With n = 3, an additional auxiliary
variable r is necessary. Constraints (31)–(33) enforce ri,j
to be equal to the ‘or’ operator between sj and si.
The game model presented in this section can be easily
extended to take into account the presence of multiple
malicious independent nodes. Under the assumption
that, in such a case, every node would behave in the
same way, the results provided in this section keep to
hold. Some new features could be required. For example,
one could redefine the actions for the verifiers allowing
them to inspect multiple position in one single action.
5.3 Empirical evaluations
Differently from the game studied in Section 4, a closed-
form solution of the game presented in this section
cannot be provided. Hence, we provide here an experi-
mental evaluation of our model.
5.3.1 Simulation setting
We consider the following scenario composed of:
• three anchors acting as verifiers on an equilateral
triangle;
• from 1 to 4 non-malicious nodes with uniform prob-
ability to appear in the monitored area;
• one malicious node;
• a number |S| of discretized subregions of S.
For reasons of symmetry, we can work directly on the
space of the deception ∆ instead of the positions y. More
precisely, we assume that the malicious node directly
chooses the deception ∆ associated with its fake position
and then it chooses the fake position with uniform
probability over all the fake positions with deception
∆. This reduction is safe and allows us to reduce the
dimensions of the malicious node’s strategy space from
two (S ⊂ R2) to one (∆ ⊂ R).
Given this reduction and the assumption that each
non-malicious node can appear uniformly on all the
values of the deception, we derive Ω as function of ∆.
Ω is a mixed probability distribution, including discrete
probability and continuous probability measure. More
precisely, when ∆ = 0, Ω returns a probability and this
probability is the ratio between the area of the triangle
whose vertices are the verifiers and the total area moni-
tored by the three verifiers:
√
3R2
4
(pi−√3)R2
2
≈ 0.61. Indeed, if
a non-malicious node appears inside the triangle, it will
be perfectly localized and therefore the deception will be
zero. Instead, if the non-malicious node appears outside
the triangle, its potential deception is not zero. In this
case, Ω(∆) =
6
√
R 1
4
−∆2−2∆R√3
R2 3
2
(pi
3
−sin(pi
3
))
. We report in Fig. 9, with
blue color, the graph of Ω as ∆ varies between [0,∆∞],
we recall that in this case ∆∞ = 0.2679R.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Ω
∆
∆∞
Fig. 9. Probability distribution Ω as function of ∆∆∞ (when
∆
∆∞
= 0, Ω is a probability, when ∆∆∞ > 0, Ω is a
probability measure) and a discretization with |S| = 5.
We discretize the possible values of ∆ in |S| regular
intervals. Each interval [∆i,∆i+1] is associated with the
value of the centroid (i.e., ∆ = ∆i+1+∆i2 ) and with
probability at the centroid (i.e., Ω(∆i+1+∆i2 ) —after the
discretization the probability is normalized such that
the sum of all the probabilities is one). An example of
discretization with |S| = 5 is reported in Fig. 9.
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Fig. 10. Optimal malicious strategies’ supports (gray) for different |S| with 1, 2 (a), 3, and 4 (b) non-malicious nodes.
5.3.2 Empirical results
We provide two empirical results:
• how the strategy of the malicious node varies as |S|
and n vary;9
• how the expected utility u∗m of the malicious node at
the equilibrium varies as |S| and n vary.
At first, we study how the strategy of the malicious
node at the equilibrium changes as discretization grain
|S| changes and as the number of non-malicious nodes
changes. We searched for a Nash equilibrium with |S| ∈
[10, 50] and a step of 2 applied to the experimental
setting described in the previous section. Given that
multiple Nash equilibria can coexist in a single game,
each with different properties, we searched a specific
Nash equilibrium to have a consistent comparison of
the strategies. More precisely, we searched for the Nash
equilibrium minimizing the expected utility of the ma-
licious node by solving the mathematical programming
problems described in Section 5.2.2 with the objective
function min u∗
m
. In Fig. 10(a) and 10(b) we report the
most significant experimental results, with |S| ∈ {10, 50},
for different values of n (plots with other values of |S|
are omitted due to reasons of space). Each subfigure
reports in gray the values of deception that are played
by the malicious node with strictly positive probability
(the strategy can be easily recovered by assigning each
9. We focus on the strategy of the verifiers because, differently
from the strategy of the verifiers, it can be conveniently graphically
represented. In addition, the strategy of the verifiers can be easily
derived from the one of the malicious node: the verifiers randomize
uniformly over all the nodes whose deception is played with strictly
positive probability by the malicious node.
action ∆ with the probability Ω(∆) and then normalizing
the probabilities to one).
It can be observed that the strategy of the malicious
node is characterized by a minimal played deception ∆
such that all the deceptions ∆ < ∆ are not played, while
all the deceptions ∆ ≥ ∆ are played. Thus, strategies
can be conveniently characterized by studying how ∆
varies as the values of the parameters change. Initially,
we evaluate how ∆ varies as |S| varies. When |S|
increases, ∆ rapidly converges to a stable value. In our
experiments, we observed that increasing |S|, ∆ reduces
and the difference in terms of ∆ between a given |S|
and |S|+1 goes to zero. For instance, when there is only
one non-malicious node, the difference between ∆ with
|S| = 50 (i.e., 0.26∆∞) and with |S| = 10 (i.e., 0.32∆∞) is
about 13%, while the difference between ∆ with |S| = 50
(i.e., 0.26∆∞) and |S| = 26 (i.e., 0.28∆∞) is about 7%.
It can be easily derived that with |S| = 50 the exact
equilibrium (without discretization) is ±2% w.r.t. the
approximate equilibrium (with discretization). |S| = 50
is thus is a satisfactory discretization. It can be observed
that with n > 2 results are similar. We evaluated also
how ∆ changes as the number n of non-malicious nodes
changes. It can be observed that ∆ increases as the
number of non-malicious nodes increases. Summarily,
this is because the probability with which the malicious
node will be chosen by the verifiers decreases as the
number of non-malicious nodes increases and the ma-
licious node can focus its strategy on larger deceptions
(as a result the expected utility increases, as shown
also below). The details follow: the optimal verifiers’
strategy is to randomize with uniform probability over
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all the nodes whose deception is played with strictly pos-
itive probability by the malicious node. In the case the
randomization is over all the nodes, the probability to
choose the malicious node is 1
n
and therefore it reduces
as O( 1
n
) as n increases. If ∆ increases, the probability that
a non-malicious node appears on a deception that is not
played by the malicious node increases and therefore the
probability with which the malicious node is chosen by
the verifiers increases. On the other hand, increasing ∆,
the malicious node increases its utility. The optimal strat-
egy is given by a tradeoff between the minimization of
the probability to be chosen and the maximization of ∆.
With two non-malicious nodes, ∆ increases by 0.02∆∞
w.r.t. the case with a single non-malicious node. When
the number of non-malicious nodes goes to infinity the
detection probability of the malicious node goes to zero,
and therefore the optimal strategy of the malicious node
is to play ∆∞ with a probability of one. Indeed, as the
number of non-malicious nodes goes to infinity, also the
number of nodes at ∆ = ∆∞ is infinity and therefore the
probability to choose the malicious one is zero. From the
above considerations, ∆ increases monotonically as the
non-malicious nodes increase and converges to ∆∞. (The
analysis with n > 5 is computationally hard given that
the game tree rises exponentially with n and requires
the development of ad hoc exact and approximate algo-
rithms; this issue is beyond the aim of this paper.)
Finally, we evaluate how the expected utility of the
malicious node at the equilibrium changes as |S| and
the number of non-malicious nodes changes. Given that
multiple equilibria can coexist in a game, we evaluate
also the range of the expected utility for all the possible
equilibria by finding the Nash equilibrium maximizing
the expected utility of the malicious node and that
minimizing it. In addition, we evaluate the safety value
of the malicious node to compare it w.r.t. the expected
utility of the Nash equilibria. Surprisingly, the maxmin
value, the value of the best Nash, and value of the worst
Nash perfectly overlap for almost all the values of |S|
and, when they do not overlap, the difference is very
small, being about 1%. This shows that the maxmin
value is a very close approximation of the expected
utility of the Nash equilibria. In addition, it shows that
all the Nash equilibria are essentially the same and these
equilibria overlap with the malicious node’s maxmin
strategy. The result is of paramount importance, because
computing the maxmin value is easy, while computing
a Nash equilibrium is hard, and therefore, by exploiting
the maxmin formulation, the algorithm can scale and
solve much larger settings.
Now, we evaluate how the expected utility varies
as |S| varies, see Fig. 11(a). It reduces as |S| reduces
converging to a given value. As already discussed above,
the convergence is relatively fast and at |S| = 50 the
expected utility results stable. In addition, we antici-
pated above, the expected utility of the malicious node
increases as the number of non-malicious node increases.
Given the impossibility to solve settings with a very
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Fig. 11. (a) Expected utility at the Nash equilibrium as
a function of |S| for different numbers of non-malicious
nodes. (b) Regression curve for the malicious node’s
expected utility at the equilibrium.
large number of nodes, even by using the maxmin
formulation, we estimate by regression how the expected
utility of the malicious node increases. We used an expo-
nential regression, given that, when n = 1, the utility of
the malicious node is 0 and, when n→ +∞, it is 1. The
resulting regression curve is depicted in Fig. 11(b) with
n ∈ [5, 100]. It can be observed that the expected utility
of the malicious node is relatively small when n is not
excessively large, showing that. although the malicious
node can pretend a fake position with deception ∆∞, the
fake position the malicious node pretends in average is
much smaller (e.g., ∼ 0.2∆∞ with n = 10) and therefore
our approach allows one to dramatically improve the
security of VM.
6 RELATED WORKS
The employment of game theoretical tools for security
is currently explored in a number of different scien-
tific communities, including computer security, artificial
intelligence and robotics, and telecommunications. The
most studied scenario consists in the strategic allocation
of resources in adversarial settings. Customarily, a secu-
rity game takes place in an environment where a player
(called attacker) threatens the engagement of malicious
activities and a player (called defender) operates in the
continuous attempt of detecting them. Customarily, the
attacker has a finite number of targets (e.g., nodes,
packets, locations) of interest where to start an attack.
On the other side, the defender has a finite number of
resources per time unit to protect a subset of targets.
The impossibility of securing all targets at the same time
entails the need for computing a (randomized) resource
allocation strategy. Against this background, solving a
security game means to apply a solution concept to the
corresponding two-player non-cooperative game [13] to
derive the optimal strategy for the players.
Starting from the seminal work of von Neumann’s
hide-and-seek games [23] to date, security games have
been adopted in different scenarios. Several works ad-
dressed the situation in which the defender controls a
pursuer with the objective of clearing the environment
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from the presence of an evader which, in turn, is con-
trolled by the attacker [24]. When no assumptions are
made over the movement of pursuer and the evader,
the games are named infiltration games [25]. When the
evader starts from a source and tries to reach a target
without being intercepted by the pursuer, the games
are named interdiction games [26]. Other interesting
variations of security games are search games [27], where
the defender’s objective is to identify the location of a
stationary malicious activity. Opposite situations, where
the attacker can move a resource and the defender
cannot, come under the name of ambush games [28].
In the specific field of WSNs, four main applica-
tions for security are currently studied in the literature
(see [29] for a detailed survey): preventing denial of
services (DoS) attacks [30], [31], [32], intrusion detec-
tion [33], [34], [35], strengthening security [36], [37],
coexistence of malicious and non-malicious nodes [38].
In the following we briefly review the main works.
The basic model to prevent DoS attacks is a two-
player general-sum non-cooperative game between the
attacker node and the WSNs [31]. Given a fixed node i,
the attacker’s available actions are: attack sensor node i
does not attack at all, or attack a different actor sensor
node; while the WSNs’ available actions are two: defend
sensor node i, or defend a different sensor node. The
authors resort to the notion of equilibrium to design
novel schemes for preventing DoS attacks.
In [33] the authors study sensor network broadcast
environment, where malicious sensor nodes can deprive
other sensor nodes from receiving a broadcast message.
They model the situation as a zero-sum two-player
game between the attacker and the intrusion detection
system. The attackers’ best strategy is to compromise
all neighbor sensor nodes of the base station in such a
way to achieve maximum payoff. Once the attacker is
detected, its payoff goes to zero.
In [36] the authors propose a secure auction based
routing protocol by means of the First-Price auction. Both
malicious and non-malicious sensor nodes compete to
forward incoming packets and, by doing so, each sensor
node improves its reputation among other sensor nodes.
The sensor nodes decide by themselves to whether to
participate in an auction, whereas a malicious sensor
node tries its best to win the bid, drop the packets, and
corrupt the network. The payoff of each sensor node is
calculated based on battery power and reputation.
In [38] the authors analyze the interactions between a
malicious sensor node and a non-malicious sensor node
in WSNs. The coexistence can give both the malicious
and non-malicious sensor nodes different benefits. The
authors model the interactions as a pair of games. The
first game is a signaling game (i.e., Bayesian extensive-
form game). The second game is played when the non-
malicious sensor node knows confidently that its oppo-
nent is a malicious sensor node.
The work described in this paper proposes a problem
different from those above. Indeed, the adversarial se-
cure localization problem appears to be original in the
literature. In addition, our work distinguishes from the
others on WSN security for the following reasons: the
other works propose simple game theoretical models
without posing attention on the computation of solution
in practice, instead in our work we provide a lot of com-
putational results directed to find equilibria. In terms of
computational contributions, our work is closer to [39],
[40], [41], [42], where the aim is the development of
algorithms to find optimal strategies in large settings, in-
cluding securing the Los Angeles International Airport,
mobile robot patrolling, and malicious packet detection
in computer networks.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied a novel game theoretical
scenario for WSNs where Verifiable Multilateration is
employed to assess the presence of malicious nodes. We
built a game theoretical framework where verifiers and
malicious nodes compete as rational players. First, we
studied the best placement of the verifiers to minimize
the maximum deception of the malicious node and we
derived the equilibrium prescribing optimal strategies.
We studied the case with three verifiers and we extended
the result to an arbitrary number of verifiers showing
how, as this number increases, the maximum deception
of the malicious node decreases. Second, we studied
how the malicious node changes its strategy when a
number of non-malicious nodes are present. We did
this by considering the best strategy for the malicious
node when verifiers can inspect one node. To find the
equilibrium, we provided a MILP formulation and we
experimentally showed that the Nash equilibria of the
game almost everywhere coincide with the malicious
node’s maxmin strategy.
One of the future directions of this work will be along
the theoretical analysis our model in the attempt to prove
that the malicious node’s maxmin strategy corresponds
to the optimal strategy at the Nash equilibrium. We
also aim at extending our framework to handle multiple
malicious nodes, additional security countermeasures,
and energy constraints.
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